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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
("DTPA")' was enacted in 1973 "to protect consumers against
false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable
*B.B.A., St. Mary's University; J.D., Baylor University; Shareholder, Cox & Smith
Incorporated, San Antonio, Texas.
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1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2003) [herein-
after DTPA].
SMU LAW REVIEW
actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection. ' 2 Although the 77th Texas Legisla-
ture enacted two sets of amendments in 2001, and additional amendments
in 2003, there are no reported decisions addressing those changes.
In 2003, the 78th Texas Legislature enacted several amendments to the
DTPA. The legislature clarified the changes to Section 17.46 made by the
77th Legislature and renumbered portions of that section.3 The legisla-
ture also added Section 17.462, which makes it an actionable false, mis-
leading, or deceptive practice to misrepresent the geographical location
of certain businesses in telephone directories or electronic databases pub-
lished on or after September 1, 2003. The section applies only to busi-
nesses that derive fifty-percent or more of their gross incomes from
selling or arranging the sale of flowers or floral arrangements. 4
Two other changes concern the state consumer protection division of
the Texas Attorney General's Office. Effective September 1, 2003, Sec-
tion 17.501 requires a consumer seeking class action status to serve the
consumer protection division with a copy of the demand required by Sec-
tion 17.505(a) and a copy of the petition. The new section also allows
trial courts to permit the consumer protection division to intervene in the
suit upon a showing of good cause.5 Section 17.47, which concerns re-
straining orders obtained by the consumer protection division, was
amended to change the amounts of civil penalties that the division can
seek, and to provide guidance for the trier of fact in setting the penalty.
The amendment also clarifies that there is no attorney-client relationship
between the consumer protection division and any person on whose be-
half the division is seeking to recover a penalty. 6
This Survey covers significant developments under the DTPA from No-
vember 2, 2002, through November 1, 2003. Noteworthy decisions during
the Survey period address consumer status, alleged breaches of warran-
ties, and preemption and exemption from the DTPA.
II. CONSUMER STATUS
In order to bring a DTPA claim, a plaintiff must be a "consumer" as
that term is defined in the statute.7 To qualify as a consumer, the plaintiff
must be an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, goods
or services; further, those goods or services must form the basis of the
plaintiff's complaint.8 Consumer status under the DTPA depends upon a
showing that the plaintiff's relationship to the transaction entitles him or
2. Id. § 17.44(a).
3. Act of May 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1276, § 4.001(a), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws
4168-70.
4. Act of May 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 191-92.
5. Acts of May 25, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 360, § 2, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1545.
6. Id. § 1.
7. See DTPA, § 17.50(a).




her to relief.9 Whether a plaintiff qualifies for DTPA consumer status is a
question of law. 10
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals examined whether holders of con-
vertible debentures of a corporation had consumer status in Great Plains
Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.1 The debenture holders
sued Morgan Stanley, which had performed a due diligence investigation
and provided a fairness opinion as a financial advisor to its client
Allwaste, Inc. in connection with Allwaste's proposed merger with Philip
Services Corporation. The trial court granted Morgan Stanley's motion
for judgment on the pleadings as to the plaintiffs' DTPA claims, holding
that the plaintiffs had not acquired goods or services from Morgan
Stanley.12
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they were consumers because the
Allwaste board of directors intended that Morgan Stanley's services
would benefit the Allwaste stockholders. They also argue that there was
an issue of fact as to whether the Allwaste board intended to benefit de-
benture holders as well because there was evidence that the board knew
that the information would be disseminated to debenture holders. The
Fifth Circuit held that this argument was misplaced. Because Morgan
Stanley had filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the question
was not whether there was a question of fact regarding the board's intent,
but whether the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded that the board had in-
tended to benefit them. The court of appeals held that the plaintiffs had
not adequately pleaded this predicate to their claims and upheld the mo-
tion for judgment.13
In Brittan Communications International Corp. v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co.,14 a reseller of long-distance telephone services sued
Southwestern Bell alleging that Southwestern Bell's temporary suspen-
sion of billing and collecting services for the plaintiff violated the Com-
munications Act of 1933 and constituted common-law fraud and DTPA
violations. Southwestern Bell claimed that it had suspended the services
due to excessive customer complaints. The relevant parties had a confer-
ence call and services were reinstated less than a month later. The plain-
tiff alleged that during the conference call, Southwestern Bell made a
misstatement regarding how quickly the services would be reinstated.
9. Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. 1996); see also
Sanchez v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a "DTPA
claim requires an underlying consumer transaction; there must be a nexus between the
consumer, the transaction, and the defendant's conduct." (citing Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at
650)).
10. Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
11. Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305 (5th
Cir. 2002).
12. Id. at 310-11.
13. Id. at 327-28.




This alleged misstatement formed the basis for the plaintiff's DTPA
claim. 15
Southwestern Bell moved for summary judgment on the DTPA claim,
arguing that the plaintiff was not a consumer because it based its claim on
the suspension of service and failure to promptly reinstate the suspended
service. The trial court granted the motion and the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
holding that a claim based upon the suspension of service, rather than any
problem with the service itself, does not give the complaining party con-
sumer status under the DTPA. 16
One case during the Survey period considered the question of when a
borrower has consumer status. The plaintiff/buyer in Bennett v. Bank
United17 sued after the bank that serviced her home loan refused to dis-
continue charging for private mortgage insurance ("PMI") despite the
buyer having reached a loan-to-value ratio of below 80 percent. The de-
fendants argued that the buyer did not have consumer status because she
never sought or obtained PMI; rather, it was her original lender that
sought and obtained the insurance. Although the buyer agreed to reim-
burse the lender for the premiums, the defendants argued that the agree-
ment was incidental to her loan obligations. The Austin Court of Appeals
recognized that "'a lender may be subject to a DTPA claim if the bor-
rower's "objective" is the purchase or lease of a good or service thereby
qualifying the borrower as a consumer."'" 8 The court first examined
whether the buyer's "objective" was the purchase or lease of a good or
service. The court held that the buyer's objective was the purchase of a
residence and that the loan, with its requirement of PMI, was incidental
to the purchase of the residence. Because the loan was incidental to the
purchase of a good, the court held that the buyer was a consumer.1 9
III. IDENTIFYING THE PROPER DEFENDANT
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether an individual could be held liable for conduct he undertook
while acting as an agent for a disclosed principal. In Miller v. Keyser,20
home purchasers, including David and Lynette Miller, sued the builder,
the builder's owner, and the builder's agent for fraud, misrepresentation,
and DTPA violations. The purchasers alleged that the agent misrepre-
sented the size of the lots and the purchasers' ability to place fencing
along the back of their lots. Although the purchasers were told that the
lots were subject to a drainage easement, they were not told that the
easement would prevent them from fencing their entire lots. The case
went to trial against the sales agent and, consistent with the jury verdict,
15. Id. at 903, 906-07.
16. Id. at 907-08.
17. Bennett v. Bank United, 114 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
18. Id. at 81 (quoting La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W. .2d 558, 567
(Tex. 1984)).
19. Id. at 80-82.
20. Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. 2002).
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the court entered judgment in favor of the purchasers. 21
The agent appealed and, relying on the Texas Supreme Court's decision
in Karl & Kelly Co. v. McLerran,22 the Houston Court of Appeals re-
versed. The court of appeals held that because the agent acted only in the
scope of his employment, he could not be held personally liable under the
DTPA.23
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals. First, the supreme court observed that the agent personally partici-
pated in the sales at issue and personally made the alleged
misrepresentations. The agent nevertheless argued that liability was fore-
closed by the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in McLerran, which held
that agents of a corporation are not liable for the company's misrepresen-
tations unless there is a finding that the agents acted as the alter ego of
the corporation.24 The Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument,
holding that McLerran had been implicitly overruled by subsequent su-
preme court decisions. The supreme court held that Texas' longstanding
rule that a corporate agent is personally liable for his own fraudulent or
tortious acts was applicable to the DTPA, and that an agent could thus be
held personally liable for his own DTPA violations.25 The agent also ar-
gued that the DTPA indemnity provision, Section 17.555, precluded indi-
vidual liability for agents. Section 17.555 provides that a person against
whom a DTPA action has been brought may seek contribution or indem-
nity from one who may have liability under common law for the damag-
ing events that are the subject of the complaint.26 The agent argued that
the DTPA thus recognizes the common-law doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior. The Texas Supreme Court held that, "the language of Section 17.555
does not excuse an agent from being a party to a suit. Rather, the indem-
nification provision provides a means for an agent to recoup his loss from
the employer if the employer is responsible for the consumer's harm. '27
The Houston Court of Appeals considered the status of a borrower in
Gonzales v. American Title Company of Houston.28 The borrowers ap-
proached defendant Woodforest Bancshares seeking a $200,000 loan to
build a house. The borrowers told Woodforest that they could not afford
more than $1,500 per month in loan payments. Woodforest had previ-
ously entered into a wholesale mortgage agreement with defendant Re-
source Bankshares Mortgage Group ("RBMG") pursuant to which
Woodforest, as broker, could sell home loans to RBMG as buyer. Wood-
forest was not required to broker all of its loans to RBMG, and RBMG
21. Id. at 714-15.
22. Karl & Kelly Co. v. McLerran, 646 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. 1983) (per curiam).
23. Miller, 90 S.W.3d at 715.
24. McLerran, 646 S.W.2d at 175.
25. Miller, 90 S.W.3d at 717.
26. DTPA § 17.555.
27. Miller, 90 S.W.3d at 718.
28. Gonzales v. Am. Title Co. of Houston, 104 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
2004] D TPA
SMU LAW REVIEW
was not required to buy all loan contracts Woodforest submitted to
RBMG.29
A few months after the loan closed, the borrowers received notice that
Woodforest had transferred its interest in their loan to RBMG. The bor-
rowers then received notice that their monthly note payment would be
$1,608. The following year, RBMG notified the borrowers that their re-
serve escrow account was below requirements. RBMG gave the borrow-
ers the choice of paying the deficiency in a lump sum or increasing their
monthly payments for twelve months. The borrowers refused to pay the
increased amount, and when foreclosure was threatened they sued, seek-
ing damages and an injunction to prevent foreclosure. The borrowers'
claims were based upon actions of Woodforest and the title company that
conducted the loan closing and issued a title policy.30
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
and the Houston Court of Appeals affirmed. Addressing the DTPA
claims against RBMG, the court held that there was not a consumer rela-
tionship between the borrowers and RBMG during the time when the
borrowers' complaints arose. RBMG was only a buyer of the borrowers'
note and had no contact with the borrowers until it purchased the note
after the loan was consummated. 31
IV. DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
In addition to establishing consumer status, a DTPA plaintiff also must
show that a "false, misleading, or deceptive act," breach of warranty, or
unconscionable action or course of action occurred, and that such con-
duct was the producing cause of the plaintiff's damage. 32
A. LAUNDRY LIST CLAIMS
DTPA Section 17.46(b) contains, in twenty-seven subparts, a nonexclu-
sive list of actions that constitute "false, misleading or deceptive acts"
under the statute.33 Plaintiffs invoking these "laundry list" claims are
generally not required to prove or plead the defendant's state of mind or
intent to deceive. 34 Nor have plaintiffs always been required to show that
they relied on the enumerated deceptions.35 Several significant cases in-
volving laundry list claims were decided during the Survey period.
The plaintiffs in Miller v. Keyser 36 sued the builder of their homes, as
well as the builder's owner and the builder's agent for fraud, misrepresen-
29. Id. at 591-92.
30. Id. at 591-92.
31. Id. at 595.
32. DTPA § 17.50(a)(l)-(3).
33. Id. § 17.466(b)(1)-(27).
34. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980). Several subsections do
explicitly involve an element of scienter. See, e.g., DTPA §§ 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (16),
(17), (24).
35. Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985).
36. Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. 2002).
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tation and DTPA violations. The trial court entered judgment in favor of
the homeowners against the agent, who appealed arguing that he should
not be held liable because he did not actually know that the representa-
tions were false. The Houston Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
and the plaintiffs petitioned for review. Holding that the DTPA does not
require a consumer to prove intent to make a misrepresentation, the
Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, stating that the DTPA was
designed to provide consumers with a remedy for false, misleading and
deceptive business practices "'without the burden of proof and numerous
defenses encountered in a common law fraud or breach of warranty
suit." 37 Thus, misrepresentations that may not be actionable under com-
mon law fraud may be actionable under the DTPA because the DTPA
does not require the consumer to prove that the defendant acted know-
ingly or intentionally. 38
In Branton v. Wood,39 home purchasers brought an action against the
seller after the home washed off its foundation during a flood. The pur-
chasers alleged that the seller's representation that the house was com-
pletely repaired after a prior flood was false because the house would not
have washed off its foundation but for the seller's failure to repair rotten
wood after the prior flood. The trial court granted the seller's motion for
partial summary judgment on the DTPA claims and the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals affirmed. In response to the seller's motion, the pur-
chasers had offered an expert report stating that, "'[i]n inspecting further,
it became evident to me that the structure had sustained previous water
damage to the plates allowing them to rot and weaken so much as to
allow the structure to lift and float off the slab."' 40 The court of appeals
held that the expert report was not competent summary judgment evi-
dence because there was no factual support underlying the opinion that
the damage was caused by previous water damage. The court further
held that the report did not support the purchasers' DTPA claim that the
home was not properly repaired after the prior flood. The expert did not
conclude that the plates were not repaired or not properly repaired after
the prior flood and did not discount other plausible causes for the rot.
The court held that without such evidence, it could not conclude that the
seller's representation of proper repair was false, misleading, or
deceptive.4 1
Allison v. Fire Insurance Exchange42 arose from water damage and re-
sulting mold contamination to a home. The homeowners were unhappy
with their insurance company's handling of the problem and sued, alleg-
ing breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
negligence, and DTPA violations. Regarding the DTPA claims, the
37. Id. at 716 (quoting Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980)).
38. Id.
39. Branton v. Wood, 100 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
40. Id. at 648.
41. Id.
42. Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
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homeowners alleged that an agent of the insurer misrepresented to them
that "complete" plumbing tests had been performed on the home even
though the agent "secretly" thought that there might be other leaks. At
trial, the plumber who performed the tests testified that the tests per-
formed were "complete" according to his company's procedures. There
was also evidence that the agent's concerns were not "secret," as despite
the lack of leaks located by the plumbing tests, she contacted a civil engi-
neer to perform further analysis. Nevertheless, the jury found in favor of
the homeowners on their DTPA claims.43 The insurance company ap-
pealed and the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that
the jury could have reasonably concluded that the agent's characteriza-
tion of the test was a misrepresentation and that the homeowners' reli-
ance on the letter caused further damages to the house.44
The plaintiff in Aiken v. Hancock45 sued his former attorney raising
claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligence, gross
negligence, and DTPA violations and seeking equitable fee forfeiture.
Aiken alleged that the attorney (1) falsely represented that he was pre-
pared to go forward with Aiken's case; (2) failed to reveal that he was not
prepared to go forward and try the case; (3) falsely represented that an
expert witness was prepared to testify; and (4) failed to reveal that the
expert was not prepared to testify.46 Aiken argued that these statements
were express misrepresentations and constituted unconscionable actions.
The attorney moved for summary judgment on the DTPA claims, arguing
that Aiken's claims were properly characterized as a single legal malprac-
tice claim. 47
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the attorney and
the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that at most,
the statements constituted negligent conduct, not deceptive conduct. Cit-
ing Latham v. Castillo,48 the court held that the allegations did not sup-
port an independent cause of action under the DTPA separate from a
legal malpractice cause of action. Since Texas law does not permit a
plaintiff to fracture a legal malpractice claim, summary judgment on the
DTPA claim was proper.49
B. SECTION 17.50-BREACH OF EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES
Although a DTPA claim may be based upon the breach of an express
or implied warranty, the DTPA does not itself create any warranties. 50
To be actionable under the DTPA, an implied warranty "must be recog-
43. Id. at 234-37.
44. Id. at 245, 251.
45. Aiken v. Hancock, 115 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied).
46. Id. at 24.
47. Id. at 28.
48. Latham v. Castillo, 972 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1998).
49. Aiken, 115 S.W.3d at 29.
50. Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1995); see DTPA
§ 17.50(a)(2).
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nized by the common law or created by statute."'51 The Dallas Court of
Appeals examined this issue in Anthony Equipment Corp. v. Irwin Steel
Erectors, Inc.52 In that case, which arose from an accident during a two-
crane lift of a steel truss, a steel erection subcontractor sued the lessor of
a crane used in the lift for negligence, breach of contract, breach of im-
plied warranty, and knowing violations of the DTPA. After a jury found
in favor of the subcontractor, the lessor moved for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict on the issue of implied warranty, arguing that there
was no implied warranty under the facts of the case. The trial court
granted the motion.53
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed. Citing the Texas Supreme
Court's opinion in Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Lubbock County
Hospital District,54 the court first acknowledged that an implied warranty
for services exists only when the services relate to the repair or modifica-
tion of existing tangible goods or when public policy mandates. Here, the
crane owner provided the crane services to assist in the tandem lift, not to
repair or modify tangible goods or property. The court held that public
policy did not mandate imposing an implied warranty because other ade-
quate remedies were available to the subcontractor. Because there was
no implied warranty under the circumstances of the case, a directed ver-
dict was appropriate against the subcontractor. 55
United States Tire-Tech, Inc. v. Boeran, B.V.56 involved the question of
whether privity of contract is required for a breach of express warranty
claim. Boeran is a wholesale distributor of tire-liner products. Boeran
purchased the product from Marketing Ventures, Inc. ("MVI"), whom it
assumed was the manufacturer, and had no contact with the true manu-
facturer, Tire-Tech, until Boeran received numerous complaints about the
product and filed suit. The jury found that both Tire-Tech and MVI had
breached both an express warranty and an implied warranty of
merchantability, and the court rendered judgment against MVI on all the-
ories. However, the judgment stated that Tire-Tech was liable for breach
of an express warranty but not breach of an implied warranty. Only Tire-
Tech appealed arguing in relevant part that Boeran could not prevail on a
DTPA claim based upon a breach of express warranty in the absence of
privity of contract between Boeran and Tire-Tech.57
After examining numerous cases from other courts of appeals, the
Houston Court of Appeals held that privity of contract is not required to
51. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d at 438 (citing La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 673
S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984)).
52. Anthony Equip. Corp. v. Irwin Steel Erectors, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2003, pet. dism'd).
53. Id. at 197-98.
54. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Lubbock County Hosp. Dist., 987 S.W.2d 50
(Tex. 1998).
55. Anthony Equip. Corp., 115 S.W.3d at 208-09.
56. U.S. Tire-Tech, Inc. v. Boeran, B.V., 110 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
57. Id. at 196-97.
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sustain a breach of express warranty claim for purely economic losses.
The court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise could allow unscrupulous
manufacturers who make public representations about their product's
performance to remain insulated from express-warranty liability if con-
sumers did not purchase the product directly from them. '58
The plaintiff in Elliott v. Kraft Foods North America, Inc.59 sued Kraft
Foods alleging that she had bitten into a hard object while eating Grape
Nuts cereal manufactured by Kraft. She testified that she found rocks in
the cereal. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff but
failed to award her attorneys' fees. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that
she was entitled to attorneys' fees under the DTPA because she had
"presented conclusive evidence that Kraft had breached [the] implied
warranty of merchantability. '60
To show a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that goods are not fit and that they are unfit because
they lack something necessary for adequacy.61 Because the trial court
had failed to file the requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
Houston Court of Appeals had to imply findings from the trial court's
judgment. The court held that the judgment against Kraft necessarily im-
plied that the trial court found there was a rock in the cereal due to no
fault of the plaintiff and that the rock caused the plaintiff injury. Based
upon these implied findings, the court held that there was no evidence in
the record to support the trial court's implied finding that Kraft did not
breach the implied warranty of merchantability and, to the contrary,
there was conclusive evidence that Kraft had breached the warranty.62
The court also held, based upon expert testimony from a dentist, that the
record conclusively established that the breach of the warranty was a pro-
ducing cause of the plaintiff's injuries. As the plaintiff had conclusively
established the elements of a DTPA claim based upon breach of the im-
plied warranty of merchantability, she was entitled to an award of attor-
neys' fees. 63
C. UNCONSCIONABILITY
DTPA Section 17.45(5) defines an "unconscionable action or course of
action" as "an act or practice which, to a consumer's detriment, takes
advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of the
58. Id. at 198.
59. Elliott v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 118 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
60. Id. at 53.
61. Id. at 56-57.
62. Id. at 58.
63. Id. at 57-59; see also Cont'l Dredging, Inc. v. De-Kaizered, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 380,
391-92 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. filed) (holding that a dredging company's failure
to dredge a channel to a uniform thirty-six feet as promised constituted a breach of the
implied warranty to perform in a good and workmanlike manner).
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consumer to a grossly unfair degree. '64 In Bennett v. Bank United,65 a
home buyer argued that Bank United's policies provided her the oppor-
tunity to cease paying PMI once she had twenty-percent equity in her
home and that the defendants' refusal to discontinue the PMI require-
ment was unconscionable. The Austin Court of Appeals first noted that
the buyer had executed a deed of trust providing for PMI premium reim-
bursement until the loan was paid in full. Second, although Bank United
told the buyer that it had a policy that would permit canceling a mortga-
gor's requirement of paying PMI premiums, by the time the buyer had
sufficient equity the mortgage was held by First Boston Mortgage, which
did not have such a policy. Finally, the court recognized that requiring
buyers to pay PMI premiums for the lender was standard practice in the
industry. Based upon these facts, the court held that no unconscionable
action occurred. 66
In United States Tire- Tech, Inc. v. Boeran, B. V.,67 a tire sealant distribu-
tor sued the manufacturer, with whom the distributor had never dealt
directly, for DTPA violations arising from the manufacturer's allegedly
unconscionable actions. The Houston Court of Appeals held that an un-
conscionable act is only actionable under the DTPA if it is "committed in
connection with the plaintiff's transaction in goods or services. ' 68 The
court affirmed the trial court's decision not to grant the wholesaler a jury
question on unconscionability because the wholesaler was not involved in
a consumer transaction with the manufacturer. 69
V. DETERMINING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A prevailing plaintiff in a DTPA action may recover economic dam-
ages.70 If the trier of fact finds that the defendant acted "knowingly," the
plaintiff may also recover damages for mental anguish and additional
statutory damages up to three times the amount of economic damages.71
A. REQUIREMENT OF "KNOWING CONDUCT"
To act "knowingly" is to act with the actual awareness of the falsity,
unfairness, or deception of the conduct in question.72 "Actual aware-
ness" means more than merely knowing what one is doing; rather it
means knowing that what one is doing is false, misleading, or deceptive
64. DTPA § 17.45(s).
65. Bennett v. Bank United, 114 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet. h.).
66. Id. at 82.
67. U.S. Tire-Tech, Inc. v. Boeran, B.V., 110 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet. h.).
68. Id. at 202.
69. Id. at 202-03; see also Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 251 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2002, no pet.) (finding no evidence to support a jury finding of unconscionable
conduct because the only allegation was of a simple misrepresentation and not every mis-
representation constitutes unconscionable conduct).
70. DTPA § 17.50(b)(1).
71. Id.
72. DTPA § 17.45(9).
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and deciding to do it anyway. Even conscious indifference towards the
consumer's rights or welfare is insufficient. 73
In Allison v. Fire Insurance Exchange,7 4 the Austin Court of Appeals
examined the sufficiency of the evidence that the defendant's conduct
was done knowingly. The plaintiffs were homeowners who sued their
home insurer after being unhappy with the insurer's handling of claims
for water damage and mold remediation. The jury found that the insurer
had acted knowingly. On appeal, Fire Insurance Exchange argued that
the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding of know-
ing behavior. The Austin Court of Appeals agreed. The court examined
the record and held that there was no evidence that the insurer was more
than consciously indifferent to the homeowners' rights and welfare. The
court thus reversed the jury's award of punitive damages. 75
B. MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered the evidence of mental
anguish necessary to survive a "no evidence" summary judgment motion
in Anderson v. Long.76 Anderson experienced problems with a custom-
ized horse trailer she had purchased from the Longs. She sued the Longs
and the manufacturer, alleging breach of contract, negligence, breach of
warranty, and DTPA violations. The trial court granted the Longs' mo-
tion for summary judgment on the breach of warranty and DTPA claims;
Anderson appealed, arguing that she had produced evidence of false,
misleading, or deceptive practices that were the producing cause of
mental anguish damages.77 "To support her mental anguish claim, An-
derson averred that the trailer had been the source of extreme fright,
constant worry, extreme apprehension, and nervousness on a daily basis
for nearly the entire time she had owned it."'78 She further alleged that
she was frightened that the trailer would burn and that the experience
had caused her to lose sleep and had been extremely nerve racking and
extremely embarrassing on a daily basis. The Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals held that a plaintiff must demonstrate emotional distress that
caused a substantial disruption in her daily routine and that amounts to
more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. The
court held that Anderson's evidence did not reach this standard and that
summary judgment in favor of the Longs therefore was appropriate. 79
73. See St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Dal-Worth Tank Co., 974 S.W.2d 51, 53-54
(Tex. 1998).
74. Allison, 98 S.W.3d at 227.
75. Id. at 257-58.
76. Anderson v. Long, 118 S.W.3d 806 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
77. Id. at 808-09.
78. Id. at 811.
79. Id.
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VI. DTPA DEFENSES AND EXEMPTIONS
The DTPA has been characterized as a "strict liability" statute, requir-
ing only proof of a misrepresentation without regard to the offending
party's intent.80 This is only partially correct, since several DTPA provi-
sions expressly require proof of intentional conduct. 8' The courts, the
Texas Legislature, and the United States Congress have also carved out
exemptions from the DTPA's reach. 82
A. PREEMPTION AND EXEMPTION FROM THE DTPA
Certain statutory schemes and common-law doctrines bar DTPA
claims either expressly or by implication, or affect a plaintiff's procedures
for bringing DTPA claims. During the Survey period, several cases ex-
amined these limitations on the DTPA's reach.
1. The Federal Communications Act of 1934
Section 332 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (the "FCC
Act") provides in relevant part that "no State or local government shall
have any authority to regulate the ... rates charged by any commercial
mobile service."' 83 This provision has been interpreted to prohibit state
courts from adjudicating state law claims if the court would be required
to determine the reasonableness of a set rate or to set a prospective
charge for services. 84 The plaintiffs in Bryceland v. AT&T Corp.85 were
subscribers of AT&T's digital service who sued AT&T for fraud in the
inducement, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and DTPA
violations. AT&T moved for summary judgment, arguing that the FCC
Act preempted all of the claims because any award of damages would
amount to prohibited indirect rate regulation. AT&T argued that the
claims "would require the factfinder to determine the quality of services
provided and, in doing so, it would necessarily determine if AT&T has
adequate infrastructure to operate a wireless service and to set the value
of the provided services."'86 The trial court granted the motion and the
plaintiffs appealed.87
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed. Following the analysis used by
the FCC, the court held that a carrier that charged a reasonable rate for
its services might nevertheless be liable for damages if it misrepresented
its rates or how those rates would apply or misrepresented or failed to
80. See, e.g., White Budd Van Ness P'ship v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture, 798
S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd).
81. See, e.g., DTPA § 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (16), (17), (24).
82. See, e.g., Id. § 17.49.
83. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2001).
84. Bryceland v. AT&T Corp., 114 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet.
filed) (citing In re Wireless Consumers Alliance, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 17021 39, 2000 WL
1140570 39 (2000)).
85. Id.




disclose material terms and conditions on its services. 88 The court then
reviewed the factual allegations in the plaintiffs' petition and concluded
that adjudicating the allegations would not require the trial court to pre-
scribe, set, or fix a reasonable previous or prospective rate. Rather, the
trial court would merely determine the difference between the value of
what AT&T promised and what the plaintiffs received. Section 332 thus
did not preempt the plaintiffs' claims.8 9
2. The Carmack Amendment
The Carmack Amendment governs a motor carrier's liability to a ship-
per, consignor, holder of a bill of lading, or buyer for the loss of, or dam-
age to, an interstate shipment of goods. 90 The Amendment subjects the
motor carrier to absolute liability for actual loss or injury to property.91
If a transaction is governed by the Amendment, state statutory and com-
mon-law claims involving the transaction are preempted.92 The plaintiff
in Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines93 sued a moving company under various
theories including the DTPA for damage to her personal belongings dur-
ing a move from Texas to Virginia. The moving company moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that such claims were completely preempted by
the Carmack Amendment. The Fifth Circuit recognized that in Beers v.
North American Van Lines, Inc. ,94 it had held that the Carmack Amend-
ment did not completely preempt that plaintiff's claims against a moving
company. The court then held that it was no longer bound by the holding
in Beers because the Supreme Court's decision in Beneficial National
Bank v. Anderson95 had expressly overruled the preemption analysis used
in Beers.96 The court then turned to an analysis of whether Congress
intended a shipper's remedy under the Carmack Amendment to be exclu-
sive. After examining prior Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit decisions
discussing the reach of the Carmack Amendment, the court held that
Congress did intend for the Carmack Amendment to provide a shipper's
exclusive cause of action for loss or damages to goods during interstate
transportation and thus, state law claims arising from such transportation
were completely preempted. 97
3. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") 98
88. Id. at 555 (citing In re Wireless Consumers Alliance, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 17021 27,
WL 1140570 27 (2000)).
89. Id.
90. 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (2000).
91. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137 (1964).
92. Accura Sys., Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1996).
93. Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 2003).
94. Beers v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1988).
95. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 123 S. Ct. 2058 (2003).
96. Hoskins, 343 F.3d at 775.
97. Id. at 776-78.
98. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
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regulates the content and format of labeling for herbicides and requires
that all herbicides be registered with the Environmental Protection
Agency. 99 FIFRA preempts common-law tort suits that are based solely
upon claims relating to labeling.1° ° In Dow Agrosciences L.L.C. v.
Bates,1° 1 an herbicide manufacturer sought a declaratory judgment
against Texas peanut farmers who were threatening to sue it for crop
damages caused by its herbicide. In a published opinion that was dis-
cussed in last year's Survey,10 2 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Lubbock Division, held that the farmers of-
fered no evidence that the distributors' remarks were different from the
information on the herbicide's label. 10 3 Because claims premised on off-
label remarks are preempted when they merely repeat the information on
the label, the court held that FIFRA preempted those claims. 10 4 The pea-
nut farmers appealed and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that
because the farmers' breach of warranty and DTPA claims were based on
allegedly misleading comments made by Dow retailers and the farmers
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the comments dif-
fered from the herbicide's label, the claims were preempted and summary
judgment was appropriate. 10 5
4. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
In Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,106 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division, was called
upon to determine whether the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act 10 7 preempted DTPA claims arising from alleged problems with
Bridgestone/Firestone tires. The Act expressly states that remedies under
the Act are in addition to other rights and remedies under state or federal
law. 10 8 Thus, by its express terms, the Act does not preempt state law
claims. 109
B. CAUSATION
Liability under the DTPA is limited to conduct that is a producing
cause of the plaintiff's damages." 0 Unlike the doctrine of proximate
99. Quest Chem. Corp. v. Elam, 898 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Tex. 1995).
100. Id.
101. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C. v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2003).
102. Michael Ferrill & Leslie Sara Hyman, Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Pro-
tection Act, 56 SMU L. REV. 1481, 1501 (2003) (discussing Dow Agrosciences L.L.C. v.
Bates, 205 F. Supp. 2d 623 (N.D. Tex. 2002)).
103. Dow, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 627.
104. Id. (citing Andrus v. AgrEvo USA Co., 178 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1999)).
105. Bates, 332 F.3d at 331-32.
106. Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 715 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
107. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30170 (2000).
108. 49 U.S.C. § 30103(d).
109. 232 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
110. Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995).
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cause, producing cause does not require that the injury be foreseeable."l '
"Producing cause" has been defined as "an efficient, exciting, or contrib-
uting cause, which in a natural sequence, produced injuries or damages
complained of."' 112 When determining whether the actions complained of
are a producing cause of a plaintiff's damages, courts look to whether the
alleged cause is a substantial factor that brings about the plaintiff's injury,
without which the injury would not have occurred. 113
The San Antonio Court of Appeals applied the concept of producing
cause in Smith v. Hennessey & Associates, Inc.,'114 which arose from the
sale of a home. The home had been purchased by the plaintiff's mother.
At the time of the original purchase, Hennessey & Associates appraised
the property and represented to the purchaser's lender that the house
consisted of 3,000 square feet. When the plaintiff later listed the house
for sale, another appraisal was done, which revealed that the house con-
sisted of only 2,552 square feet. The plaintiff sued Hennessey, alleging
negligence, breach of contract, and violations of the DTPA. The trial
court rendered summary judgment in favor of Hennessey on all claims
and the plaintiff appealed. 115
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the
plaintiff failed to present evidence that her mother saw, much less relied
upon, the Hennessey appraisal. Nor did the plaintiff present evidence
that her mother obtained the home loan based upon representations
made by Hennessey or that she suffered damages as a result of any repre-
sentation made by Hennessey. In fact, the plaintiff even failed to attach a
copy of the Hennessey appraisal to her summary judgment response. In
the absence of any evidence that the allegedly incorrect appraisal caused
any damages, summary judgment was proper. 116
The plaintiff in Bennett v. Bank United"1 7 alleged that lenders violated
the DTPA by failing to provide her with written notice of her possible
right to terminate PMI and stop reimbursing the premiums. The defend-
ants maintained that they were entitled to summary judgment on this
claim even assuming that the alleged failure to notify was true. The trial
court granted summary judgment and the Austin Court of Appeals af-
firmed, holding that since the buyer had expressly agreed in the deed of
trust to pay the PMI premiums until the note was paid in full, "she could
suffer no injury from having to live up to her part of the bargain." 118
111. See Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ
dism'd).
112. Union Pump Co. v. Albritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995).
113. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).
114. Smith v. Hennessey & Assocs., 103 S.W.3d 567 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no
pet.).
115. Id. at 568-69.
116. Id. at 569-70.
117. Bennett, 114 S.W.3d at 75.
118. Id. at 82-83.
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C. A "MERE" BREACH OF CONTRACT IS NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER
THE DTPA
A breach of contract unaccompanied by a misrepresentation or fraud is
not a false, misleading, or deceptive act and thus does not violate the
DTPA.119 During the Survey period, two cases applied this law to the
facts before them.
The plaintiff in Continental Dredging, Inc. v. De-Kaizered, Inc.120 was a
dredging company that contracted with a dock owner to dredge to a uni-
form depth of thirty-six feet in front of a dock. The plaintiff sued the
dock owner seeking to compel payment on the contract and the dock
owner counter-claimed for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and
DTPA violations arising from the dock owner's allegation that the dredg-
ing company had not, in fact, excavated to a uniform thirty-six feet. The
jury awarded the dredging company damages offset by damages awarded
to the dock owner on its DTPA claim and both parties appealed. Regard-
ing the dock owner's DTPA claim, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held
that all of the alleged misrepresentations were in substance alleged
breaches of the terms of the contract. The alleged misrepresentations
therefore gave rise only to a breach of contract claim, not a DTPA
claim. 121
The plaintiff in Wayne Duddlesten, Inc. v. Highland Insurance Co.1 22
sued insurance companies from which it had purchased worker's compen-
sation insurance alleging that they had inappropriately settled and paid
several claims asserted against the plaintiff by its employees. The plain-
tiff included a DTPA claim based upon the defendants' alleged misrepre-
sentations about the standard and quality of the insurance services, the
rights and remedies that the policies provided, and upon the defendants'
alleged failure to disclose information concerning the services and bene-
fits. The insurance companies filed a motion for summary judgment con-
tending that there was no evidence of misrepresentations and that
deposition testimony conclusively established that the plaintiff could not
prevail. The trial court granted the motion.123
The Houston Court of Appeals affirmed. The court found that the al-
leged misrepresentations stemmed from defendants' alleged failure to
comply with the terms of the insurance contracts. Such allegations may
give rise to a breach of contract claim, but cannot form the basis of a
DTPA claim. 124
119. Ashford Dev., Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Serv. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex.
1983); Quitta v. Fossati, 808 S.W.2d 636, 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ
denied).
120. Cont'l Dredging, Inc., 120 S.W.3d at 380.
121. Id. at 389-90.
122. Wayne Duddlesten, Inc. v. Highland Ins. Co., 110 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
123. Id. at 89-91.




This year's DTPA cases continue trends observed in earlier surveys.
Decisions involving consumer status,125 and the defendant's relationship
to the transaction forming the basis of the plaintiff's claim, 126 continue to
explore the outer contours of the statute's reach. Statutory exemptions
and preemption doctrines similarly place limits on the DTPA's availabil-
ity, 127 as do cases elaborating on the principle that a "mere breach of
contract" cannot be converted into a DTPA claim through artful
pleading.1 28
With the exception of the 2003 amendment creating Section 17.426129
(which surely ranks as one of the more peculiar pieces of special interest
legislation tacked onto the DTPA), and a minority of appellate decisions
where the plaintiff's claims survived, the past year was not a kind one to
DTPA plaintiffs. Of the surveyed cases, two-thirds were decided in the
defendant's favor. Equally telling, this year's total of nineteen reported
cases is well below the average of thirty-four cases annually reported in
the six preceding surveys. On the legislative front, the 2003 amendments
appear designed to erect additional obstacles for DTPA class actions and
attorney general suits seeking civil penalties. Thirty years after the stat-
ute's original enactment, and after several earlier periods of expansion
and contraction of the DTPA's reach, the current trend seems to be one
of continuing retrenchment.
125. E.g., Great Plains, cited supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text; Brittan, cited
supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text; Bennett, cited supra notes 17-19 and accompany-
ing text.
126. E.g., Miller, cited supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text; Gonzales, cited supra
notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 83-109.
128. E.g., Continental Dredging, cited supra notes 120-21; Wayne Duddelston, Inc., cited
supra notes 122-24.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
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